During the 1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts to fight high and persistent levels of unemployment. Although these contracts have been widely used, unemployment has remained about the same after fifteen years. This paper builds a theoretical model to reconcile these facts. We analyse the labour market effect of the introduction of fixedterm contracts and the firm's choice of contracts are studied. Permanent contracts are the standard way to offer incentives, but fixed-term contracts are cheaper. This generates an externality, which can make employment higher in the system with only permanent contracts. As a consequence, from a social point of view, the share of fixed-term contracts is too large. Increases in the renewal rate of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts lead to higher employment levels. Finally, the model highlights the interactions between different rigidities in the labour market. Aggregate employment and the share of temporary contracts are affected in the same way by the firing costs and the flexibility of wages.
Introduction
Most European countries are considered economies with highly regulated labor markets, particularly when compared to the US. At the same time, it is also a well known fact that, since the mid-1970s, Europe has had much higher unemployment levels than the US. It has often been suggested that the di¤erent degrees of ‡exibility of their labor markets could be responsible for the di¤erences in their labor market performances. Despite the ongoing debate on the possible causes of European unemployment and, in particular, on the possible e¤ect of labor market ‡exibility, 1 many European countries have already started to implement reforms in their labor markets: more ‡exible regulations have been introduced to …ght high and persistent levels of unemployment. Typically, European labor markets have been characterized by a wide use of permanent contracts with, what appear to be, high …ring costs. A common way to increase ‡exibility has been to allow employers the option of hiring workers using …xed-term contracts with negligible …ring costs. For most countries, these …xed-term contracts cannot be used continuously and forever. They require a conversion into permanent contracts after a speci…c amount of time. In addition, for most countries, the job for which the worker is hired with a …xed-term contract is not required to be a seasonal one. 2 Since their introduction, …xed-term contracts have been widely used. These account for most new jobs. 3 More surprisingly, they have been used for all types of jobs and occupations. 4 However, unemployment has remained as high as before the reforms. At the same time, this type of reform has created a two-tier system and the labor market has become highly segmented. 5 
This 1
For instance, see Bean (1994) and Layard et al. (1991) for a survey on unemployment and Jackman et al. (1996) , Nickell and Layard (1998) and Piore (1986) for the debate on labor market ‡exibility. 2 See Grubb and Wells (1993) and OECD (1993, 1994 and 1999 ) for a detailed description of …xed-term contracts regulations in Europe. 3 For instance, in Spain 98% of newly registered contracts between 1986 and 1992 were …xed-term contracts (see Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992 ). In France, in 1992, 80% of all entries were hirings on …xed-term contracts (see Goux et al., 2000) . 4 See OECD (1993). 5 The share of …xed-term contracts in Spain has gone from 11% to 35% between 1983 and 1995. In France, it has gone from 3.3% to 12% during this period. See OECD (1993) .
is mainly due to the low transition of …xed-term contracts into permanent ones. 6 This paper builds a theoretical model to reconcile these facts: unchanged unemployment levels despite the wide use of more ‡exible labor contracts. The introduction of …xed-term contracts is analyzed in the framework of an e¢ciency wage model. As will be discussed, this kind of model is best suited to examine the two main di¤erences between …xed-term and permanent contracts, namely, …ring costs and contract duration. High wages are the standard way to provide incentives with permanent contracts, but …xed-term contracts are cheaper. The …rm's choice of hiring with one contract or the other is analyzed. Firing will be given exogenously. So, in the terminology of labor demand models, …rms will be operating in the hiring regime. Fixed-term incentive-compatible contracts are then characterized. I will show that the instrument that allows the provision of incentives with …xed-term contracts is not their wage, but the renewal rate of these contracts into permanent ones. Fixed-term contracts are chosen by …rms when they are cheap enough. But this implies an externality which can make aggregate employment higher in a system with only permanent contracts. Firms do not take into account, in the two-tier system, that the increase in out ‡ows from unemployment result in higher wages for permanent contracts. In this case, the optimal renewal rate of …xed-term contracts from the social point of view is one. That is, employment can be increased by reducing the in ‡ows back to unemployment.
There is a growing literature on the impact of …xed-term contracts on several aspects of the labor market. 7 In relation to the e¤ects on aggregate employment, the literature has been dominated by partial equilibrium models of labor demand. 8 These models have the same characteristics as those of labor demand with …ring costs. 9 These are very useful to understand the e¤ects of these …ring restrictions on the dynamic functioning of the labor market. But the e¤ects on aggregate employment are ambiguous and remain in partial equilibrium.
Here, I choose an e¢ciency wage model to study the impact of …xed- 6 In Spain, between 1987 and 1996, only 11% of …xed-term contracts are converted into permanent ones (see Güell and Petrongolo, 2000) . 7 See, for example, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (1999), Alba (1994 Alba ( , 1996 Alba ( and 1998 , Bentolila and Dolado (1994) , Goux et al. (2000) , Toharia (1993 and and Saint-Paul (1996). 8 Exceptions of this are Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997) and Alonso-Borrego et al. (1999) . 9 See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) , Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994) , Bertola (1992) and Nickell (1978) . term contracts on employment through their e¤ect on wages. 10 This type of model not only allows for e¤ects of …ring costs on wages but it is also possible to consider a broad view of employment protection legislation and not just severance payments. In particular, dismissal con ‡icts which have been blamed for being costly can be modeled in a simple way.
One additional characteristic of …xed-term contracts is that they di¤er in duration with respect to permanent contracts. The existing literature has not explicitly taken this into account. In a competitive labor market, the duration of contracts does not matter. In an e¢ciency wage model, duration of contracts is an important source of incentives. Studying …xed-term contracts in an e¢ciency wage model allows to explicitly address the question of how incentives may be provided in short duration contracts. This, in turn, would answer the previously mentioned striking fact that …xed-term contracts are used even for jobs where duration matters. So, in the model, the share of …xed-term contracts is endogenous.
This paper highlights the links between di¤erent rigidities in the labor market. Employment and the share of …xed-term contracts are a¤ected in the same way by the …ring costs associated with permanent contracts and the ‡exibility of wages in …xed-term contracts. The mechanism by which the creation of employment and, more precisely, permanent employment are discouraged is the combination of these last two. The introduction of …xed-term contracts does not completely remove the e¤ect of …ring costs unless the wages in …xed-term contracts are perfectly ‡exible. For this reason, two extreme situations could generate higher employment than a two-tier system with unchanged …ring costs and less than perfectly ‡exible wages in …xed-term contracts. One would be a situation in which the wages of …xed-term contracts are very high. In this system, permanent contracts alone would generate higher employment than the two-tier system. The other situation would be the case with perfectly ‡exible wages in …xed-term contracts. In this case, full employment would arise.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is introduced. First, I consider an economy where only permanent contracts are available and …ring costs reduce employment (section 2.1). Then, the introduction of contracts with no …ring costs (…xed-term contracts) in such economy is ana- 10 In Saint-Paul (1996), chapter 7, this is also studied although it is assumed that …xed-term workers are already di¤erent ex-ante from permanent workers and are paid at the competitive wage. This "dual labor market" approach does not allow to analyze why in Europe most of the out ‡ows from unemployment are …xed-term contracts nor the renewals of …xed-term contracts into permanent contracts.
As it will be shown, full employment is possible in a two-tier system despite the presence of the incentive problem. lyzed (section 2.2). The optimal incentive-compatible contract is described, the …rm's choice of contracts is analyzed, and then the market outcome is derived and compared to the situation where only permanent contracts are available (section 2.3). Section 2.4 presents a welfare analysis of the two-tier system. Finally, section 3 concludes.
The model
The model is a version of the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) with two types of contracts. Firms can choose to hire new workers with a permanent (PC) or with a …xed-term contract (temporary contract, TC). 12 Contracts di¤er in length and …ring costs. To make the model as simple as possible, assume that TCs last one period and that PCs can last an in…nite number of periods. A worker can only be hired once on a TC by the same …rm. Thus, after the one period TC, the …rm has to decide whether to renew the worker into a PC or to …re him. 13 A TC is going to be renewed into a PC with an (endogenous) probability R.
The model is set in discrete time and workers decide in each period whether or not to shirk. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz, a worker's e¤ort is not perfectly observable and there is a detection technology that catches shirking workers (never erroneously) with some probability q (where q < 1). When a worker is found shirking, he is …red and becomes unemployed. To simplify, suppose that unemployment bene…ts are zero. In this model, all workers are identical. 14 In addition, workers are risk neutral and their instantaneous utility function is: U (w; e) = w ¡ e; where w is the wage and e is the e¤ort. Workers' e¤ort choices are discrete. If they shirk, they expend zero e¤ort and production is zero. The e¤ort required to perform in the job is e > 0. The e¤ort is the same in any contract because there is only one type of job.
Every period, workers choose the level of e¤ort that maximizes their utility actualized at rate r. Let V i jt , i = fs; ng; j = fP; T g be the present 12 The terms …xed-term and temporary contract (TC) will be used interchangeably throughout the paper. 13 This is only a simplifying assumption. Assuming that …xed-term contracts can be renewed into further …xed-term contracts does not change the results because, as it will be shown, it will be necessary that at some point …xed-term contracts get renewed into permanent ones. 14 Therefore, I am not considering the possible use of TC to observe worker's characteristics. I implicitly assume that the "trial" period of the contract has already elapsed and has been useful for this matter. As a consequence, there is no adverse selection problem but only a moral hazard one. In most countries, TC include a "trial" period with no costs of separation on either part, as in PC.
discounted utility of an employed worker with contract j (P for permanent contracts and T for temporary contracts) at period t when shirking (i = s) or non shirking (i = n).
Only permanent contracts available

Firing costs
Assume that the legislation …xes a severance payment for permanent contracts, but no severance payment for TCs. 15 Modelling mandated severance payments in a shirking e¢ciency wage model allows to distinguish cases in which workers are …red without right of …ring indemnities (when they are caught shirking, that is a disciplinary dismissal) from other ones in which the …rm has to compensate …red workers (in case of redundancies or shocks). 16 Since I focus on hiring decisions of …rms, the modelling of the second case is kept simple: workers have an exogenous probability b of being separated from their job, in that case they are protected by the legislation.
Another important aspect of employment protection legislation systems is the workers' right to sue employers in case of disagreement and what is considered an "unfair" case (see OECD, 1999) . Permanent workers have the right to sue employers in every case of dismissal, but workers with a TC cannot do it when they are not renewed. 17 The e¢ciency wage model allows to consider dismissal con ‡icts explicitly. In such a context, con ‡icts between employers and employees can arise in relation to the (unobservable) e¤ort. A double moral hazard can arise, where …rms use disciplinary cases when facing redundancies to try to avoid paying …ring costs and workers deny any disciplinary case to try to get compensation. This implies that court resolutions will be imperfect, given the information problem. Consequently, disciplinary cases are not costless, they cost dC, where C is the severance payment and d is the probability that the court declares it "unfair". Given this information problem, d > 0. 15 I am considering that indemnities, when the contract expires, are zero, which is the case in most countries. Also, as temporary contracts can be made su¢ciently short, it can be assumed realistically that they do not involve …ring costs, because the …rm always waits for the end of the contract whenever it wants to adjust employment. 16 The terms redundancies and shocks are used interchangeably in this paper. 17 As mentioned before, being TC su¢ciently short, temporary workers are actually not renewed rather than being …red for other reasons. This implies that, in practice, temporary workers can never sue employers in court. 18 This is a simple version of Güell (2000) . There, redundancies cost zC, where z¸d because …rms can have greater chances to proof a truly disciplinary case than a hidden redundancy. As shown, this cost is neutral on employment. Therefore, for simplicity, in
Non-shirking condition
In this section, I analyze the wage workers must be paid in order to provide the optimal e¤ort on the job. Since PCs are assumed to have a stationary form, 19 it is possible to omit time indices. When a worker does not shirk in a PC, he gets a utility equal to
where w P is the wage of a PC and V U is the present value of utility of an unemployed worker. If the worker decides to shirk in a PC, his utility is
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , shirking saves the current disutility of e¤ort but it implies a higher risk of becoming unemployed. This risk is proportional to the probability of being caught shirking (q). Firing costs also in ‡uence the e¤ort decision here because of the imperfect court decisions. With probability d; shirking workers may be compensated with a severance payment. This reduces the cost of shirking.
The worker will choose to provide an e¤ort e if and only if V n p¸V s p . Using equations (1) and (2), the NSC P in form of utilities can be written as
This condition states that in order to provide incentives, the punishment of losing a job must be at least equal to the opportunity cost of shirking, denoted by K. Substituting this condition into equation (1), the incentivecompatible wage in a PC can be written as
In this wage equation, it is possible to distinguish between the reservation wage (…rst three terms) and the rent linked to the incentive problem (last term). For C = 0, this condition is the same as in the original Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . In order to provide incentives, wages need to exceed the reservation wage by a rent, K: This rent is proportional to the opportunity cost of not shirking weighted by the term (r + b). The higher the discount this paper I assume that z = 1.
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For discussions of possible forms of bonding see Katz (1986) . rate, the more a worker values the saving of e¤ort today. The higher the probability of being …red for other reasons than (truly) shirking cases (i.e. shocks), the more costly it is to expend e¤ort today.
For C > 0, it is possible to distinguish two types of e¤ects of …ring costs: those directly related with the incentive problem and those that are not. Firing costs a¤ect the incentive problem because to the extent that (truly) disciplinary dismissals are declared "unfair" (i.e., d > 0), legal severance payments reduce the punishment associated with being …red when caught shirking. This implies that …rms have to pay higher rents in order to prevent shirking, as can be seen in the above non-shirking condition (see equation 3) .
At the same time, independently of the incentive problem, the introduction of mandated severance payments allows the employer to reduce the wage exactly by the same proportion that the present discounted utility of an employee is increased, without a¤ecting incentives. This can be seen in the …ring cost element of the reservation wage (see equation 4). The idea is that lower wages today, together with compensation when being …red for shocks, leave the present discounted utility of being employed unchanged. 20 If the PC satis…es the N SC P , that is, if the worker is paid at least b w P , or if being unemployed a is su¢ciently large punishment (V n P > V U ), the worker will choose to expend the e¤ort e. Let V P be the expected utility of holding a PC in equilibrium. The …rm chooses the minimum wage at which the worker will not shirk, so that in equilibrium the NSC P is binding and
Many countries have legal minimum wage constraints. Implicitly, I am assuming here that the legislated minimum wage would be a slack constraint. This will become more relevant in the next section where temporary contracts, which will be paid at the minimum wage level, are considered.
Hiring decisions
In this model, all …rms are identical and in…nitely lived. They chose employment to maximize the present discounted value of pro…ts M ax
where L P is employment in the system with only PCs and f (L P ) is a CRS production function with f 0 (L P ) = m: In steady state, 21 labor demand is 20 This e¤ect of …ring costs is the same as that proposed by Lazear (1990) . 21 The steady state is reached after one period. For t = 0, employment is simply given by m = w P since there are no workers to be …red.
given by
This equation shows that, for given wages, …ring costs reduce labor demand proportionally to their expected present value.
Market equilibrium
Equilibrium occurs when each …rm, taking as given all other …rms' wages and employment, …nds it optimal to o¤er the going wage rather than a di¤erent wage. The key market variable that determines …rm individual behavior is the present value utility of an unemployed worker, V U . Let a be the rate of exit from unemployment. Therefore
Given that the NSC P is satis…ed, in equilibrium
Substituting equation (6) into equation (4), the e¢ciency wage curve in equilibrium can be written as
In equilibrium, the incentive-compatible wage is higher the higher the exit rate from unemployment. This result is also found in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . The rent linked with the incentive problem is weighted by a because the higher a; the less becoming unemployed is a penalty.
Aggregate employment, L P , is derived from the steady state ‡ow condition. In steady state, in ‡ows to unemployment are given by bL P . Out ‡ows are given by a(N ¡ L P ), where N is the total of workers in the economy. Thus a(N ¡ L P ) = bL P :
Therefore,
Combining equations (5) and (7), the equilibrium out ‡ow rate from unemployment, a ¤ , can be written as
In equation (10), it can be seen that the second type of e¤ect of severance payments mentioned before can be fully undone. The idea is that if markets are complete and perfect, and …ring costs are fully transferred to workers, then they are neutral on employment because the wage is reduced by the same proportion as the increased shadow cost of labor (see Lazear 1990 ).
However, in this model, even if …ring costs are fully received by workers, they are not neutral because they a¤ect the rent, K. The e¤ects of severance payments on the e¢ciency wage setting have no counteracting e¤ects through the non-wage component of the shadow cost of labor. Therefore, the wage schedule is shifted to the left and it has a negative impact e¤ect on employment. Firing costs have a real e¤ect because they reduce the cost of shirking.
The aggregate N SC P can also be written in terms of the unemployment rate, u. Replacing equation (8) into equation (7), this condition can be written as
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , this expression shows the incompatibility of full employment with incentives. 22 This expression can be represented in the (w P; L P ) space. Figure 1 shows the labor market equilibrium in the presence of (non-neutral) …ring costs and compares it with the no …ring cost situation.
Temporary and permanent contracts available
For a given vacancy, …rms can now choose among temporary and permanent contracts. PCs look exactly the same as in the previous section. TCs are analyzed in the following section.
Non-shirking condition in a temporary contract
Since TCs have a non stationary form and this is precisely what will drive the results, it is convenient to use time indices to start analyzing them. The incentive problem to examine is that of a worker holding a TC at period t which can be renewed into a PC at period (t + 1) with probability R: If the contract is not renewed, the worker becomes unemployed. Thus, the 22 As it will be shown, this is not necessarily the case when …xed-term contracts are introduced.
incentive problem at (t + 1) is exactly the same as in a PC. So, the nonshirking constraint of a TC at (t + 1); NSC T (t+1) ; is just the non-shirking constraint of a PC, i.e. NSC T (t+1) = NSC P .
Provided that the NSC T (t+1) is satis…ed, then expected present discounted utility of being employed with a TC at period t of not shirking and of shirking is given respectively by
where w T is the wage of the TC and R is the probability in which temporary contracts get renewed into permanent ones. Again, shirking implies saving the disutility of e¤ort today but implies a higher risk of becoming unemployed tomorrow. Moreover, in a TC, not being caught shirking is a necessary condition in order to be renewed into a PC. It has been assumed that all workers are identical and that there is a "hidden action" problem but not a "hidden information" one. Thus, in TCs, expenditure of e¤ort does not give any additional information about the worker's characteristics that could in ‡uence renewal. But, expenditure of e¤ort in a TC makes renewal more likely than when shirking. Not shirking reduces the probability to become unemployed directly.
A …rst important remark is that if there is no renewal of TC into PC at the end of period t, then shirking is always strictly preferred (if R = 0, then V n T t ¡ V s T t = ¡e < 0). The idea behind this is very simple: if a worker always becomes unemployed independently of the e¤ort expended, there is no way to give incentives to the worker by paying him a higher wage. The only way to induce workers not to shirk in a TC is that the …rm commits to a su¢ciently high renewal rate. In other words, that …ring is not automatic after the end of a TC.
I am considering an extreme case where TCs last only one period and thus the wage paid does not a¤ect incentives. But still, in a more general case, even if the TC was longer, when unemployment is certain at the end of the contract, wages have no incentive role. Instead, the prospects of renewal do. When it is uncertain for a worker that he will keep the job tomorrow, his preoccupation is more about his renewal than his wage. Once there is no uncertainty about ending one's contract (except for exogenous reasons), then workers are motivated by the wage they get paid.
The condition that guarantees incentives to expend the e¤ort in a TC at period t; that is, the non-shirking condition of a temporary contract at t, i.e. NSC T t can be written as
This condition states that incentives in a TC can be given by the renewal rate of TC into PC and/or by the rent associated with holding a PC. Incentives given with future wages is the standard idea of e¢ciency wages. The renewal rate is also related to the incentive problem in a similar way: for given (V P (t+1) ¡ V U(t+1) ), R needs to be higher, the higher the required e¤ort (e); the more ine¢cient the control technology (q); the higher the interest rate (r); and the higher the probability of exogenous redundancies(b).
The two mechanisms that can provide incentives in a TC are substitutes: the higher the renewal rate, the lower the wage can be in a PC given the incentive problem. And vice versa. However, for given permanent wages, the renewal rate cannot be zero, as thought intuitively. Also, for given R, workers in a PC must enjoy some rent, as in the standard e¢ciency wage models. Figure 2 represents the NSC T t in the space (R; V P ¡ V U ).
An incentive-compatible TC must satisfy the NSC T t and the NSC P . As seen in the previous section, workers in PCs are paid the minimum rent compatible with incentives, that is, the NSC P is binding. This reduces the possible values of R to Figure 3 represents the two non-shirking constraints of a TC. The thicker line in the graph represents the combinations of (R; V P ¡ V U ) where the two NSC are satis…ed. And R ¤ is the renewal rate for which both NSC are binding. Note that for the case where d > 0, R ¤ < 1. That is, if …ring costs are non-neutral on permanent employment, the minimum incentivecompatible renewal rate is less than one.
To conclude this section, it has been found that incentives in a TC are provided with a combination of a non-zero renewal rate into a PC and a non-zero rent paid in a PC. The rent is the minimal rent compatible with incentives given by the NSC P , and the renewal rate R can take any value within the N SC T t compatible with such rent, that is R¸R ¤ . Let this condition be N SC T : Let V T be the expected utility in equilibrium of a TC. Since V T satis…es the N SC T ; then V T = V n T : In the next section the …rm's objective function is introduced and its choice of contracts as well as the determination of R is analyzed.
Choice of contracts in a two-tier system
I …rst analyze the choice of contracts for a given vacancy and then calculate in the next section the …rm's labor demand for the given (optimal) contract chosen.
When the …rm hires a new worker, it can choose between a PC (as the one described in section 2.1) or a TC (as the one described in the previous section). The …rm compares the present discounted value of marginal pro…ts with the two di¤erent types of contracts taking into account their respective incentive constraints. Let ¦ it be the present discounted value of marginal pro…ts with type i contract (i = T; P ). That is
where
Firms always get the net product instantaneously with any type of contract. Then, with a PC, the …rm incurs the …ring cost if there is a redundancy, otherwise the contract continues. TCs end after one period. If there is a shock, the contract does not continue and this is not costly for the …rm. Otherwise, the contract continues, becoming a permanent one (with probability R) or restarting with a new worker with another TC (with probability 1 ¡ R).
Lemma 1. The optimal contract in a two-tier system is a …xed-term contract that is renewed into a permanent contract with probability R.
Proof: It is easy to note that the permanent contract problem (i = P ) is just the subproblem at (t + 1) of the temporary contract problem (i = T ) at t. Since the wage in a TC, w T , has no incentive role (implying that it will not be higher than the e¢ciency wage in a PC) and there are no …ring costs, the …rm cannot be made worse o¤ by starting with a …xed-term contract. 23 Therefore, the optimal strategy for the …rm is to start with a TC and after one period renew it into a PC with some probability R. The renewal rate is chosen to maximize the present discounted value of marginal pro…ts of a TC (¦ T ) subject to the N SC T . The …rm also chooses the wage to be paid during the TC. For reasons that will become apparent, I consider two cases: 23 If the wage in a TC is higher than in a PC then the two-tier system would not be an equilibrium (see Proposition 2).
(1) where w T is ‡exible and the …rm only has to consider a participation constraint and (2) where there is some legislation that sets the wage at least at a minimum level, say w min . In this case, the participation constraint is slack. 24 The complete characterization of the incentive-compatible TC is given by M ax
case ( Proof: see appendix. The idea behind this result is simple. If wages in TCs are perfectly ‡exible, all the e¤ects of …ring costs on the wage setting of the PC can be undone with the wage of the …rst period while the worker is in a TC. Thus the …rm is indi¤erent among any renewal rate because pro…ts can always be kept constant. In this case, the economy would be at full employment. 25 Instead, if wages are not perfectly ‡exible, the optimal rate of renewal is the minimum compatible with incentives, that is R ¤ , where R ¤ < 1: The mechanism that is preventing higher renewal rates is the non-neutral e¤ect of …ring costs on the e¢ciency wage. Figure 4 represents the iso-pro…ts curves for the two cases in the space (R, V P ¡ V U ):
Back to the initial question, note that this result provides an interesting and paradoxical explanation of the use of TCs: when temporary contracts are very "cheap", the …rm is actually indi¤erent among TCs or PCs. While when temporary contracts are more "expensive", the …rm actually chooses the minimum share of PC given the incentive constraints. 24 As mentioned, the legislated minimum wage would be a slack constraint in the world with only permanent contracts. A further discussion on this is done in section (2.3) when the two systems are compared. 25 To see how full employment can be reached in an e¢ciency wage model see Remark 1 in section 2.2.4 where employment in a two-tier system is derived.
Hiring decisions
In this section I derive the labor demand for the optimal type of contract described in Proposition 1 (case 2). 26 Firms maximize employment given the wage of TC (w min ) and renewal rate (R ¤ ) of this contract. Such a contract implies that the total workforce will be the sum of those workers with a TC (those who are in the …rst period of their contract) and those with a PC. Workers with a PC are either those who have just been renewed from a TC or those who already had a PC and were not …red. To distinguish from the system in which only PCs were available, I denote with " e " the value of variables that were also present in that system (i.e. L P ; w p ; a; V U ). Thus
and e L P 0 = 0:
Firms maximize the present discounted value of pro…ts (16) . The steady state labor demand is given by m =¯w min + (1 ¡¯)
In a two-tier system, the marginal product of labor is equalized to a weighted sum of the marginal cost of a TC and the marginal cost of a PC. The weights correspond to the actualized share of TC, (¯); and PC, (1 ¡¯); respectively. A more detailed discussion on¯is done in the next section.
Market equilibrium
As before, the key market variable is e V U . In a two-tier system, all contracts start with a TC. Therefore,
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As mentioned, there is full employment in case 1.
Replacing equation (18) into equation (12) , e V U in equilibrium can be written as
where the term e(1 + r)=q denotes the importance of the shirking problem in a TC, that is, R ¤ (V P ¡ V U ); given by (14) . Now, going back to equation (4), the e¢ciency wage of a PC in a two-tier system is given by
As before, e L is derived from the steady state ‡ows conditions 27 . Let e L be total employment in the two-tier system, which equals temporary employment, L T plus permanent employment, e L P: In ‡ows and out ‡ows into employment have basically the same structure as in the system only with PCs. There are also the ‡ows from the renewal and non-renewals of TC. Figure 5 represents all these ‡ows.
In the steady state, the out ‡ow from unemployment is given by e a(N ¡ e L) workers. The in ‡ow to unemployment comes from those whose TC is not renewed,
and from all those who lost their jobs for exogenous reasons, b e L. Thus
At any time, a proportion R ¤ of those TCs that are not …nished for exogenous reasons, are renewed into PCs, while a proportion b of those already in PCs become unemployed. So
Combining these last two conditions, temporary and permanent employment can be written as
The proportion of TCs is given by
27
The optimal contract described above implies that the steady state equilibrium can be reached in two periods. and (1 ¡ ®) is the proportion of permanent contracts.
Combining (17) and (20), the equilibrium out ‡ow rate of unemployment in a two-tier system, e a ¤ , can be written as
(24) Going back to the e¢ciency wage in the two-tier system, it is possible to express (20) in terms of the unemployment rate. This allows to do the following remark. Replacing (22) into (21), the out ‡ow rate from unemployment can be written as
where e u = (N ¡L T ¡ e L P )=N is the unemployment rate in the two-tier system. So, the e¢ciency wage curve in equilibrium is given by
Remark 1 Full employment is not incompatible with the incentive problem in a two-tier system as it is in the system with only one type of contract (as in Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) . But it would always be a "mixed" full employment, i.e. full employment in which TC and PC coexist.
This can be seen directly from expression (25): the incentive-compatible wage for zero unemployment rate is …nite. 28 This is in sharp contrast from the situation with only PCs (see equation 11). However, this full employment would be 'mixed', in other words, with both types of contracts coexisting. In this case, full employment is compatible with incentives. The reason is that each type of employment gives incentives to the other: temporary workers are motivated by the possibility of getting a better contract, that is, a permanent contract. And permanent workers are motivated to work in order to avoid restarting with a …xed-term contract. 29 28 From Proposition 1, we have that in case 1, for any combination of (w T ; R), a ¡! 1:
29
Although temporary wages are lower than those in a PC, temporary workers get incentives from the renewal prospects into higher utility contracts. Firing costs make TC
Comparing two systems: two-tier vs. only permanent contracts
In this section I compare employment levels and the e¤ects of …ring costs in each system. I start with the equilibrium conditions for each system.
For a system to be an equilibrium, it has to be the case that …rms cannot make higher pro…ts by o¤ering the other type of contract within that system. Lemma 2. The equilibrium conditions for each system depend on the level of the minimum wage.
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 2 For w min > m, the system with only permanent contracts is the only equilibrium. For w min < m, the two-tier system is the only equilibrium. For w min = m, any of the two systems can be an equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix The idea behind this result is that given that in the system with only PCs workers are paid their marginal product, when the minimum wage is above m, TCs are more costly than PCs so …rms would o¤er PCs only. On the contrary, when the minimum wage is below m, TCs are "cheap" and …rms end up in a two-tier system. For the case where the minimum wage is exactly m, any contract has the same cost and both systems generate the same pro…ts so either of the two systems could be an equilibrium.
Employment levels
It is important to know if the introduction of TC generates higher employment or not despite the fact that, in general, it creates a higher segmentation of the labor market. Comparing (24) with (10), it is possible to distinguish two e¤ects at play. On the one hand, for given wages, employment is higher in a two-tier system due to a composition e¤ect. The weight¯corresponds to an actualized share of TC given by ® (equation 23). 30 On the other hand, worse not only because …red workers are not paid an indemnity, but also because they make R ¤ < 1. If there were no …ring costs, then R ¤ = 1 and the only potential di¤erence between contracts would be their wage. In this case, an upward sloping wage pro…le would not generally be a perfect substitute for a …rst-best contract with an upfront fee, as argued by Akerlof and Katz (1989) .
w min . That is, if …rms are patient, they equalize the marginal product of labor to the average cost of labor. In the opposite extreme case, …rms only perceive the cost of the present labor force which is always holding a TC. This also has an e¤ect on employment. If wages of PC are higher in a two-tier system than in a system with only PCs, ceteris paribus, employment would be lower in a two-tier system. Lemma 3. The di¤erence in employment levels in the two systems depends on the level of the minimum wage.
Proof: see appendix Intuitively, the composition e¤ect is lower the higher the minimum wage is. From Proposition 1, the share of TC in the economy is constant for any (positive) w min and, therefore, increases of the minimum wage are not compensated by a reduction of TCs. At the same time, the di¤erence in permanent contract wages in the two systems also depends on the level of minimum wages. The higher the minimum wage, the higher the permanent wage in the two-tier system. 31 This, in turn, also reduces employment in the two-tier system. So, the e¤ect of TC on employment depends crucially on the level of minimum wages. Therefore, a two-tier system does not guarantee higher levels of employment. More precisely, the following proposition can be formulated:
Proposition 3 There exists a value w Proof: see appendix. The idea is that for high enough minimum wages, the fact that a two-tier system has less permanent workers is not compensated by their higher labor cost. The interest of the result is that there is a range of values for which the w min is high enough to make employment in the two-tier system lower, but it is not so high to as to make directly labor costs higher in the two-tier system. Indeed, it is possible to have higher employment in the system with only PCs even though PCs are still paid above the minimum wage constraint. That is, the composition e¤ect is not eliminated. Now, the question is: Is it always the case that a system is an equilibrium when employment is higher in that system? The study of this question gives the following proposition:
Proposition 4 When the system with only PC is an equilibrium, employment is always higher in such a system. But in the range of minimum wages, 31 This comes from the fact that in the two-tier system all contracts start being TC which are paid at the minimum wage.
w min 2 (w ¤ min ; m); employment is higher in a system with only PC even though a two-tier system is the resulting equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix. When …rms chose PCs it is because TCs are too expensive. By the same token, the two-tier system would generate lower employment and the system with only PCs (which generates higher employment) is the only equilibrium. The mechanism behind is that when the minimum wage is low enough, …rms do not take into account that by using TCs (and not PCs directly) they hire more, increasing e a, and therefore increasing e w p so much that total employment turns out to be lower than it would have been with only PCs .
E¤ects of …ring costs in a two-tier system
In the system with only PCs , the e¤ect of …ring costs was clear-cut: their non-neutral e¤ect on the wage setting reduced employment. Given the results on employment in a two-tier system found in the last section, it is interesting to analyze the e¤ects of …ring costs in the two-tier system. That is, are …ring costs neutral in a two-tier system despite the fact that the sign of employment is ambiguous?
In the two-tier system, …ring costs also reduce employment, but it is important to distinguish two e¤ects. First, they reduce employment just like in the system with only PCs because of their positive e¤ect on permanent contract wages. Note that this e¤ect is lower than in the other system since the proportion of permanent employment is in general lower. Second, …r-ing costs also play a role in the determination of the renewal rate. The higher the rent in a PC (due to the e¤ect of …ring costs), the lower incentivecompatible renewal rate, R ¤ , needs to be.
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This reduces the above e¤ect. That is, employment is less reduced. The question then is: does it eliminate it completely?
Proposition 5 The neutrality of …ring costs cannot be restored with the introduction of …xed-term contracts for any imperfectly ‡exible temporary wage.
Proof: see appendix. The intuition is that the incentive problem imposes a minimum proportion of permanent employment and that its costs can only be compensated at the expense of lower wages for temporary workers. But, as it is shown, there is no positive temporary wage that can undo the e¤ect of …ring costs.
This e¤ect could make insiders holding a PC push for higher …ring costs and …rms accept it since it would allow them to o¤er lower renewal rates to new entrants with TC.
This means that the introduction of TC may imply higher employment despite the fact that it does not remove the ine¢ciency of …ring costs completely. What happens then when the non-neutrality e¤ect of …ring costs is reduced? That is, what happens if d is reduced? In the system with only PCs, employment increases. In the two-tier system, employment also increases as well as the renewal rate of TCs. So, the labor market is less segmented. This explains why the introduction of TCs keeping PCs unchanged (that is, leaving the non-neutral e¤ects of …ring costs unchanged) leads to a substitution of TCs for PCs without a necessary increase of total employment. Therefore, the removal of the non-neutrality e¤ects of …ring costs is an e¢cient policy. Whether it would have more impact e¤ect in one system or the other depends again in the level of minimum wages that determine the di¤erence in employment in both systems.
Welfare Analysis
Finally, it is important to know if the equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto e¢cient or not. The social planner maximizes aggregate welfare
In steady state, the in ‡ows and out ‡ows from each group are such that maximizing aggregate welfare across agents is equivalent as maximizing the expected utility of a representative individual that gets all the resources in the economy, that is
which in turn equals
that is, total output minus the social cost of production (the e¤ort, e).
Thus, the central planner is only concerned with total employment. Therefore, from Proposition 4, the market outcome is not always e¢cient. More precisely, the two-tier system is not always socially optimal. So, what is the socially optimal renewal rate of TCs?
The social planner maximizes employment in a two-tier system subject to the NSCs and the minimum wage constraint. Moreover, the social allocation must be pro…table from the private point of view, that is aggregate pro…ts must be non-negative. So, the social planner solves 
The resolution of this problem leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 6 There exists a value w Proof: see appendix.
Thus from the social point of view, there are gains from reducing the segmentation of the labor market because this increases total employment. In particular, the two-tier system does not generate higher employment compared to the system with only PCs, the socially optimal renewal rate is larger than the private one. The intuition is the following. Firms do not take into account that when they increase the rate of renewal, permanent wages will fall. Thus, they chose the minimum incentive-compatible renewal rate because they take as given permanent wages.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed the introduction of …xed-term contracts in an economy where …ring costs reduce employment. The model has shown that the choice of …xed-term contracts is understandable even in a context of e¢ciency wages. The idea is that the renewal rate into permanent contracts has an incentive role. In addition, renewal rates are lower the higher the (negative) e¤ect of …ring costs on employment.
It is often stated that the argument for introducing …xed-term contracts is that this is "the price to pay to get full employment". But higher employment at the expense of segmentation of the labor market only arises if wages are very ‡exible. Otherwise, employment is not necessarily higher than in a system with only permanent contracts while the labor market becomes segmented. The idea is that perfect wage ‡exibility would be required in order for …xed-term contracts to eliminate the non-neutrality e¤ect of …ring costs. This can explain why the introduction of …xed-term contracts keeping permanent contracts unchanged (that is, leaving the non-neutral e¤ects of …ring costs unchanged) leads to a substitution of …xed-term for permanent contracts without a necessary increase of total employment as it is seen in some European countries.
Moreover, from the social point of view, market segmentation is too large. Higher renewal rates of …xed-term contracts into permanent contracts lead to higher employment levels. This analysis suggests that, policies on the employment protection legislation tackling the core labor contracts can be more e¢cient in motivating the creation of employment and, more precisely, the creation of permanent employment. ² In case 1, the …rm chooses to pay the lowest wage that satis…es the participation constraint, that is w T such that V T = V U : Using equation (12), in equilibrium, this wage is given by
So, w T = w T (R; V U ; V P ):
And, sign
The …rst element (¦ P ¡ ¦ T ) shows the direct e¤ect of the renewal rate on temporary pro…ts: every contract renewed gives ¦ P instead of ¦ T . The second element shows the indirect e¤ect of the renewal rate through the wage setting in TCs: an increase in the renewal rate implies an increase of the utility of holding a TC proportional to the rent in permanent contracts, (V P ¡V U ); which allows to reach the participation constraint with a reduction of the wage in TCs (and therefore increase pro…ts) by the same amount.
It is possible to rewrite the above expression in terms of total surplus, S i , of a match with the current worker on a PC or on a TC, that is,
The di¤erence in surplus among the di¤erent contracts depends crucially on the renewal rate and on the fact that TC can only be used once on the same worker. If the renewal rate is 1, then TCs and PCs generate the same total surplus. Their di¤erence is just in the distribution of this surplus among current worker and employer. Secondly, the fact that TCs can only be used once on the same worker implies a change of utility (from holding a TC to becoming unemployed) for current workers holding a TC whenever they are not renewed. Therefore
The fact that …rm chooses the wage such that V T = V U , implies that
Therefore, the …rm is indi¤erent among any incentive-compatible R.
Note that from the whole economy point of view the two types of contracts also generate the same surplus because when a TC is not renewed, the …rm starts a new one with another worker. The intuition for this is simple: there is only one type of job in the economy and workers are all homogeneous. Globally, the di¤erent contracts just determine a di¤erent distribution of surplus among workers and employers.
² In case 2, the wage for TCs is …xed exogenously and there is only a direct e¤ect of the renewal rate on temporary pro…ts. That is
sign (¦ P ¡ ¦ T ) = sign(w T ¡ w P ¡ bC 1 + r ) < 0; since w T · w P : So, the …rm chooses the minimal renewal rate incentive-compatible.
Proof of lemma 2
Proof. : ² A system with only PCs is an equilibrium i¤:
² A two-tier system is an equilibrium i¤:
Condition (26) is satis…ed i¤ w min¸b w
Proof of proposition 2
Proof. : From lemma 2: for every value of w min the equilibrium is de…ned as follows:
² if w min < m; the two-tier system is an equilibrium. ² if w min = m; any of the two systems can be an equilibrium. ² if w min > m; the system with only PCs is an equilibrium.
Proof of lemma 3
Proof. : Employment in each system is given, respectively:
From equation (10),
From equation (24), e a ¤ = X(1 + r) 1 ¡ X ; where
and b J´J ¡(m¡w min )(1+ r):
The di¤erence in employment in the two systems is given by:
; where e a ¤ = e a ¤ (w min ): 
Proof of Proposition 4
² From proposition 2, the system with PCs only is an equilibrium if w min > m: From lemma 3, employment in is this system is higher if w min > w ¤ min : From proposition 3, m > w ¤ min . This implies that whenever the system with PCs only is an equilibrium, employment is always higher in that system.
² From proposition 2, the two-tier system is an equilibrium if w min < m: From lemma 3, if w min 2 (w ¤ min ; m) employment is lower in this system. Therefore it is this same range of w min for which the two-tier system is an equilibrium despite the fact that employment in the two-tier system is lower and the minimum wage constraint is not binding in the system with only PCs.
4.7
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. : The e¤ects of F (the non-neutral …ring cost, F = dC) on employment in the two-tier system are given by For all the cases where the two-tier system is an equilibrium, m¡w min > 0: From Proposition 1 it is possible to write: w min = e ¡ (1 ¡ b)e=q + A; where A > 0 in case 2 (and A · 0 in case 1). Therefore, @e a @F < 0 in case 2.
Thus, @ e L @F < 0; in case 2. That is, for all w min in case 2, …ring costs reduce employment.
Proof of Proposition 6
The …rst order conditions of the social planner problem are: 
